Purpose

This application note describes how to use the built-in zeroization features and options of SmartFusion®2 system-on-chip (SoC) field programmable gate array (FPGA) and IGLOO®2 FPGA devices.

Introduction

Zeroization is a method of erasing electronically stored data by altering or deleting the contents of the data storage to prevent the recovery of the data. It is a key feature in several security applications where high-value assets are at risk.

Zeroization plays a key role in both financial and military applications, it also plays a key role in several consumer, commercial, and industrial applications, where it is desired that the intellectual property comprising the design itself is to be kept confidential.

The zeroization capability provides the designer with the ability to destroy the data in circumstances where a tamper event is detected. The SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices have built-in, easy to use tamper detection and response capability.

The user can monitor the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices tamper detection flags and send zeroization request to the system controller and erase the content inside the FPGA. The zeroization requests to the system controller can be sent directly from the user logic in the FPGA fabric through the user services interface (USI) or as system service from FPGA fabric or ARM® Cortex®-M3 processor (SmartFusion2 only) through the COMM_BLK. The zeroization feature is supported in both S and non-S versions of the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices.
Using Zeroization in SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Devices - Libero SoC v11.6

References

The following documents are referenced in this document:

• UG0331: SmartFusion2 Microcontroller Subsystem User Guide
• UG0443: SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 FPGA Security and Reliability User Guide
• UG0541: SmartFusion2 SoC FPGA Evaluation Kit User Guide
• UG0448: IGLOO2 FPGA High Performance Memory Subsystem User Guide
• UG0478: IGLOO2 FPGA Evaluation Kit User Guide
• Microsemi EnforclT Security Monitor Product Overview

Note: A zeroization technical report is available under NDA and on a need-to-know basis.

Design Requirements

Table 1 shows the SmartFusion2 reference design requirements and details.

Table 1 • SmartFusion2 Reference Design Requirements and Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Design Requirements and Details</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hardware Requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SmartFusion2 Security Evaluation Kit (M2S090TS-EVAL-KIT)</td>
<td>Rev D or later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 12 V adapter (provided along with the kit)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• FlashPro4 programmer (provided along with the kit)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• M2S090TS-1FGG484 ¹</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host PC or Laptop</td>
<td>Any 64-bit Windows Operating System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Software Requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libero® System-on-Chip (SoC)</td>
<td>v11.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SoftConsole</td>
<td>v3.4 SP1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 shows the IGLOO2 reference design requirements and details.

Table 2 • IGLOO2 Reference Design Requirements and Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference Design Requirements and Details</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Hardware Requirements</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGLOO2 Evaluation Kit (M2GL-EVAL-KIT)</td>
<td>Rev C or later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 12 V adapter (provided along with the kit)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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</tr>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libero SoC</td>
<td>v11.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:

1. For more information about “Zeroization Support”, refer to the device errata document.
2. The IGLOO2 design uses M2GL090TS-1FGG484 device in the IGLOO2 Evaluation Kit. However, the official IGLOO2 Evaluation Kit uses M2GL010T-1FGG484 device. If you want to run the application note design in M2GL010T-1FGG484, refer to the KB5659 for migrating M2GL090TS-1FGG484 to M2GL010T-1FGG484.
SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Zeroization Features

The SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices support three types of zeroization options which are Like New, Recoverable, and Unrecoverable. For more information about these three zeroization options, refer to “SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Zeroization Options” section on page 4. The user can monitor the tamper detection flag and then decide to trigger one of the three types of built-in zeroization request to zeroize the device or activate one of the other predefined or user customized tamper responses.

Zeroization is a high priority system service to the system controller in the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices. When the system controller receives the high priority Zeroization command, it stops the execution of a low priority command and service the Zeroization command.

The low priority command is aborted.

Figure 1 shows a block diagram of the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices. The user should enable zeroization and set zeroization option (using Tamper macro) and then send a zeroization request from FPGA fabric to system controller through the USI. Zeroization request can also be sent through the COMM_BLK from FPGA fabric (for both the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices) or Cortex-M3 processor (for SmartFusion2 only).

Figure 1 • SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Block Diagram
**SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Zeroization Procedures**

In the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices, zeroization includes several erase and programming operations to reduce any data remnants in the flash array to undetectable levels (that is, scrubbing). This section describes zeroization procedure in the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices.

After receiving zeroization request, the system controller programs a set of non-volatile bits that act as status flags during zeroization process. These status bits get updated throughout zeroization process to maintain the current status.

These status bits are internal to FPGA, and are not available to the user. This procedure cannot be bypassed once invoked. It is designed to complete even in the event of intentional tampering.

If zeroization cycle is interrupted prior to completion, the system controller resumes zeroization on the next power-up of the device based on the state of the status bits. Along with programming of status bits, the system controller initiates zeroization of the volatile memories of the FPGA first (that is, ECC memory, PUF and PUF key management memory, Key buffers, Frame buffers, AES and SHA256 registers, JTAG I/O buffer, MSS eSRAMs, and Fabric SRAMs), then the system controller performs verification by reading back these memories, computing, and validating a digest. After the volatile memories of the FPGA are zeroized, the non-volatile memory segments are destroyed starting with eNVM.

The FPGA flash configuration array, user security segments, and factory security segments (if applicable, depending on zeroization option selected) are erased. After all the relevant memories are cleared and scrubbed, the system controller performs a read back operation on the memory segments and calculates a digest for volatile memories, eNVM, security segments, and the fabric configuration flash. After both the erase and verify portions of zeroization are complete, a secure protocol exists to confirm if zeroization is completed successfully.

**SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Zeroization Options**

The SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices have several types of zeroization options to meet the user application requirements. Table 3 shows the various zeroization options available in the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices. These options zeroize various FPGA components and security segments based on user settings. This application note assumes user is familiar with the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices security segments and programming model, which are described in the UG0443: SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 FPGA Security and Reliability User Guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Zeroization Option</th>
<th>What Remains Intact</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Like New</td>
<td>Factory keys and factory configuration segments.</td>
<td>The FPGA configuration is destroyed and the part behaves similar to a new part from the factory.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recoverable</td>
<td>Factory configuration segment only.</td>
<td>The FPGA configuration and factory configuration segment are destroyed and a new factory key file is needed to reprogram the device.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrecoverable</td>
<td>Nothing stays.</td>
<td>All the configurations are destroyed and the device is permanently disabled and unusable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like New Zeroization Mode
The first zeroization option is Like New, which destroys all the user programmed configuration data (that is, it erases the user design information). This mode erases the device into a new device state. In other words, the device behaves as it was when it was shipped from Microsemi originally, with no user design or key information stored and is immediately ready for programming by the user.

There is no logistical impact beyond reprogramming the device to get back into operation. Selecting the Like New zeroization mode may not be advisable for some high security applications, like a new part, once zeroized the part can be reprogrammed by whoever has access to it.

The Like New zeroization mode is useful when devices go through repeated zeroization, such as when an information assurance device is being intentionally erased after a mission, for routine re-keying. During zeroization, a number of erase and write cycles are applied to the configuration NVM. Also, due to the scrubbing process, each zeroization and subsequent reprogramming uses several erase and write cycles. So, it is recommended not to use frequent zeroization.

Refer to the datasheet for the number of allowable zeroization cycle.

Recoverable Zeroization Mode
If the Recoverable zeroization option is activated, a number of the factory keys are erased in addition to the programming data erased in the “Like New Zeroization Mode” on page 5.

The following factory keys are erased:

- Factory key (FK)
- Default key-loading key (KLK)
- Factory ECC private key (SKFE, in larger devices)
- Pseudo-PUF secret (FPP)

Note: Also, one-half of the device serial number (DSN), namely the 64-bit serial number modifier (SNM), is erased.

The additional data for reconstructing the key-encryption key used for storing keys in all the security segments in encrypted form is removed and destroyed. The entire eNVM is erased including, in the larger devices, the system controller’s reserved portion containing the factory base activation code and the key code for the factory private ECC PUF key (SKFP) as well as, in all size devices the one or both device certificates.

The only programming operation available on a device that has been zeroized in the Recoverable mode is to load the recovery bit-stream. This bit-stream is not widely distributed. It is supplied by Microsemi on a case-by-case basis.

Unrecoverable Zeroization Mode
When Unrecoverable zeroization system services are activated, all the data in all NVMs in the device is destroyed (excluding metal-mask ROMs) in addition to the data erased in “Recoverable Zeroization Mode” on page 5. The eNVM data erased includes the factory segment, which is retained in the other two modes (that is, Like New Zeroization Mode and Recoverable Zeroization Mode).

The calibration data used to program devices is erased, and then the device intentionally puts itself into an unrecoverable state where it does not respond to any programming commands. The zeroization certification protocol is still active.
Table 4 provides a summary of each block within the FPGA that is erased by zeroization, along with, which zeroization option initiates the erase and how it is cleared.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FPGA Component or Block</th>
<th>Erase Protocol</th>
<th>Applicable Zeroization Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System Controller Memory (including memories associated with ECC + PUF)</td>
<td>Erased by zeroization command</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programming Frame, Key, and JTAG I/O Buffers</td>
<td>Actively Cleared</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AES/SHA Accelerators – Registers and RAMs</td>
<td>Actively Cleared</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSS SRAM</td>
<td>Actively Cleared</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric SRAM</td>
<td>Actively Cleared</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric Registers</td>
<td>Removal of Power</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cortex-M3 processor Cache</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fabric Configuration Flash Cells</td>
<td>Erased + Scrubbed by zeroization command</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The non-volatile memory segments are erased during zeroization. The eNVM segments are erased and scrubbed. As certain eNVM segments contain factory provisioned data (such as, device certificates and public keys), full erasure of eNVM sectors are executed according to the zeroization options set by the user.

Table 5 provides a summary for the FPGA security segments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FPGA Component</th>
<th>Erase Method</th>
<th>Applicable Zeroization Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Security Segment – User Lock bits</td>
<td>Actively Cleared + Scrubbed</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Segment – User Keys (UEK1&amp;2, Passkeys)</td>
<td>Actively Cleared + Scrubbed</td>
<td>All Active Zeroization options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Segment – Factory Keys</td>
<td>Actively Cleared + Scrubbed</td>
<td>Recoverable, Unrecoverable Zeroization Options</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security Segment – Device unique factory provisioned data</td>
<td>Actively Cleared + Scrubbed</td>
<td>Unrecoverable Zeroization Option</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eNVM – Factory Data</td>
<td>Actively Cleared</td>
<td>Recoverable, Unrecoverable Zeroization Options</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Using Zeroization in SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 Devices

This section describes the procedure to configure and run zeroization system service in the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices. The first step is to enable zeroization and set the zeroization option using the Tamper macro.

The Tamper macro exposes the built-in tamper detection and response signals and also allows the designer to enable zeroization and to set the zeroization option. Add the Tamper macro in the design in order to use zeroization feature.

Using Tamper Macro to Set Zeroization Option

To configure zeroization option, drag and configure the tamper macro from the IP catalog window, as shown in Figure 2.

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**Figure 2** • Tamper Macro in IP Catalog Window
Figure 3 shows the option to enable and set zeroization option in **Tamper** macro configurator for the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 (M2S050 and M2GL050) and smaller devices.

**Figure 3 • Tamper Macro Configurator for SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 (M2S050 and M2GL050) and Smaller Devices**
Figure 4 shows the option to enable and set zeroization option in Tamper macro configurator for M2S090, M2S150, M2GL090, and M2GL150 devices.

Figure 4 • Tamper Macro Configurator for M2S090, M2S150, M2GL090, and M2GL150 Devices

When zeroization is enabled and the zeroization option is set, user can send zeroization request in the following two ways:

- Send zeroization request from the FPGA fabric through the tamper macro.
- Send zeroization request through the COMM_BLK using Cortex-M3 processor or FPGA fabric.
**Zeroization Request from FPGA Fabric through Tamper Macro**

In the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices, zeroization request is triggered using the Tamper macro. The Tamper macro uses the USI bus to send zeroization request from the FPGA fabric to system controller, as shown in Figure 5.

The system controller block performs all the functions required for setting status flags and executing zeroization process.

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**Figure 5 • Zeroization Request through USI Bus**

The Tamper macro exposes the built-in tamper detection and responses and also allows enabling zeroization and setting the zeroization option. It also provides one control pin (ZEROIZE_N) that initiates zeroization process.

*Figure 6 shows the Tamper macro with zeroization input in Libero SoC software canvas. The user can apply an active low signal to ZEROIZE_N input and trigger zeroization.*

*Do not assert this pin. Microsemi recommends that the user use test modes and debug their logic connected to ZEROIZE_N to ensure proper functionality prior to connecting it to the Tamper macro ZEROIZE_N pin.*

*Note:* During debug, the part requires re-programming after zeroization.
Zeriozation Request through COMM_BLK using Cortex-M3 processor or FPGA Fabric

The SmartFusion2 zeroization is initiated through the communication block (COMM_BLK) in the microcontroller subsystem (MSS). There are two COMM_BLK instances one in the MSS and the other in the system controller, which communicate with each other.

The COMM_BLK consists of an APB interface, an eight byte transmit FIFO, and an eight byte receive FIFO. Refer to COMM_BLK chapter in UG0331: SmartFusion2 Microcontroller Subsystem User Guide.

The COMM_BLK provides a bi-directional message passing facility between the MSS and the system controller. To initiate zeroization, set up the MSS COMM_BLK register in byte mode and send the zeroization command (0xF0). The system controller reads the command from its COMM_BLK interface port and use the zeroization option set by the Tamper macro and start zeroization. The user can send zeroization system service request either from Cortex-M3 processor or through a FPGA fabric master.

Figure 6 • Tamper Macro with Zeroization Input in Libero SoC Software Canvas
Figure 7 shows the SmartFusion2 zeroization initiation flow and the blocks used for initiating zeroization in this method.

Microsemi provides system service driver and CoreSysServices soft IP to run zeroization operation in SmartFusion2. As a result, the user need not create software code from scratch in M3 or create a complex master in fabric to run zeroization system services.

CoreSysServices provides a simple user interface on one side and an AHB-Lite master interface on the FIC side to use any system services through the COMM_BlK.

For more information about CoreSysServices, refer to the CoreSysServices IP Handbook, which can be accessed through Libero SoC software.

In IGLOO2, the COMM_BlK in the system controller communicates with COMM_BlK in high-performance memory subsystem (HPMS). To initiate zeroization through COMM_BlK in IGLOO2, use a fabric master.

Microsemi provides the CoreSysServices Directcore IP that acts as fabric master to use zeroization service. The CoreSysServices soft IP communicates with the COMM_BlK through one of the FICs, and sends zeroization service request.
Figure 8 shows the IGLOO2 zeroization request flow and the blocks used for initiating zeroization system service in this method.

The following steps describe how to run zeroization:

Step1: Use Tamper macro and turn on zeroization and set the zeroization option.

Step2: Send zeroization request using the following method:

- SmartFusion2 has three options to send zeroization request:
  - Send through the USI from FPGA fabric
  - Send through the COMM_BLK using Cortex-M3 as a master
  - Send through the COMM_BLK using a fabric master or CoreSysServices IP

- IGLOO2 has two options to send zeroization request:
  - Send through the USI from FPGA fabric
  - Send through the COMM_BLK using a fabric master or CoreSysServices IP

Use Tamper macro to send zeroization request, as this provides a simple and easy to use interface to the user.
Design Description

This application note includes two design examples for demonstrating zeroization:

- Zeroize_M2GL090 design example. Demonstrates running zeroization system service in the IGLOO2 device using the tamper macro.
- Zeroize_M2S090 design example. Demonstrates running zeroization system service in the SmartFusion2 device using the system driver firmware code supplied by Microsemi and also using the tamper macro.

The SmartFusion2 device design is implemented on the SmartFusion2 Security Evaluation Kit Board using an M2S090TS-1FGG484 device and the IGLOO2 device design is implemented on the IGLOO2 Evaluation Kit Board using an M2GL090TS-1FGG484 device.

Design Example 1: Zeroize_M2GL090 Design

This design allows zeroizing IGLOO2 device using ZEROIZE_N input in the tamper macro. The design example uses eNVM, SRAM, and FPGA fabric. The ZEROIZE_N input is triggered through the USER_TAMPER_FLAG_0 input (connected to SW3) or using a tamper detect event.

The FlashPro4/5 read_idcode operation generates a tamper detection flag and initiates zeroization service through the ZEROIZE_N input. The FPGA components are zeroized using Like New option.

The design example allows viewing eNVM content before and after zeroization.

Hardware Implementation

Figure 9 shows the top level block diagram of the IGLOO2 design example. It includes the following components:

- **TAMPER_0**: This is the tamper macro, configured with Like New option. The tamper macro exposes the tamper response input, called ZEROIZE_N. It also exposes the various tamper detection flags. In the design example, the JTAG_ACTIVE output is used as one of the input to initialize zeroization.
- **Zeroize interface 0**: This block uses the USER_TAMPER_FLAG_0 and JTAG_ACTIVE signals and generate ZEROIZE_N signal. The other tamper detection flags are connected to this block, but not used in this design example. In addition, the JTAG_FLAG_GATING_SIGNAL is used to block the JTAG_ACTIVE signal from accidentally zeroizing the device.
- **RAM_init_top_0**: This block includes HPMS block and clock input. It also includes RAM_init_top_0 block to store the eNVM data after power up, as shown in Figure 9. The AHBMASTER_FIC_0 inside RAM_init_top_0 block acts as an AHB master and moves data from eNVM to SRAM after power up. The RAM_init_top_0 uses 50 MHz RC oscillator as clock input and a fabric PLL is used to generate a 100 MHz clock from the 50 MHz RC oscillator clock. This 100 MHz clock is used as the base clock for the HPMS and also for the fabric.
- **Counter28_0**: The counter block is used to show that the device is up and running.
Figure 10 shows the RAM_init_top_0 sub-block. It includes HPMS, 50 MHz RC oscillator, fabric PLL and some fabric logic.

The AHBMASTER_FIC_0 inside RAM_init_top_0 block acts as an AHB master and moves data from the eNVM to SRAM after power up. The RAM_init_top_0 uses 50 MHz RC oscillator as clock input and a fabric PLL is used to generate a 100 MHz clock from the 50 MHz RC oscillator clock. This 100 MHz clock is used as the base clock for the HPMS (my_hpms_top_0) and also for the fabric.
Figure 10 • RAM_init_top Block
**Running the Design**

The following steps describe how to run the design example on the M2GL_M2S-EVAL Kit board using the M2GL090TS-1FGG484 device:

1. Connect the power supply to the IGLOO2 Evaluation Kit with M2GL090TS-1FGG484 Device.
3. Program the SmartFusion2 Evaluation board with the provided STAPL file and power cycle the device. For more information about STAPL file, refer to "Appendix A: Design Files" section on page 26.

4. Read the eNVM or SRAM content using the steps shown in "Appendix B: Running SmartDebug" section on page 27. Power cycle the device after you exit from SmartDebug tool, so that JTAG port gets de-activated.
Figure 12 • SmartDebug Showing eNVM Content before Zeroization
5. Change the DIP switch 1 to ON to allow JTAG_ACTIVE to initiate zeroization. This DIP switch 1 signal is used as gating logic for JTAG_ACTIVE signal.

6. Right-click on Run PROGRAM Action and select Configure Action/Procedures. Figure 15 shows Select Action and Procedures Window.
7. Select **READ_IDCODE** under **Action** drop-down list and click **OK**.

The Program action changes to **Run READ_IDCODE Action**.

8. Double-click **Run READ_IDCODE Action** and system controller detects this action as tamper event and it activates the JTAG_ACTIVE signal. The JTAG_ACTIVE and DIP switch 1 signal asserts a low signal to **ZEROIZE_N** input and initiate zeroization.

The counter stops counting as the device gets zeroized. Power cycle the device and you can then read the eNVM content using SmartDebug, similar to step 4 and verify that the actual content is zeroized.
Figure 17 shows eNVM content after zeroization. Press the SW3 (connected to USER_TAMPER_FALG_0 signal) on the M2GL_M2S-EVAL Kit board to initiate zeroization instead of reading the IDCODE operation.

Figure 17 • SmartDebug Showing eNVM Content after Zeroization
Design Example 2: Zeroize_M2S090 Design

This design allows initiating zeroization in the SmartFusion2 device in two ways:

- Using C routine in the MSS
- Using ZEROIZE_N signal in tamper macro

A universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter (MMUART_0) in the MSS is used to display the initiation of zeroization system service when using C routine. When using ZEROIZE_N signal, the Flash pro READ_IDCODE action initiates zeroization service, similar to IGLOO2 design.

The design example uses eNVM, SRAM, and FPGA fabric similar to IGLOO2 design. These components zeroized using Like New option.

Hardware Implementation

Figure 18 shows the top level block diagram of the design example. It includes three main components:

- **TAMPER_0**: This is the tamper macro, configured with Like New option. The tamper macro exposes the tamper response input, called ZEROIZE_N. It also exposes the various tamper detection flags. In the design example, the JTAG_ACTIVE output is used as one of the input to initialize zeroization.

- **Zeroize_interface_0**: This block uses the USER_TAMPER_FALG_0 and JTAG_ACTIVE signals and generate ZEROIZE_N signal. The other tamper detection flags are connected to this block, but not used in this design example. In addition, the JTAG_FLAG_GATING_SIGNAL is used to block the JTAG_ACTIVE signal from accidentally zeroizing the device.

- **Top_M3_Master_0**: This block includes MSS, RC Oscillator as clock input, and various fabric resources. The 50 MHz RC oscillator as clock input and a fabric PLL is used to generate a 100 MHz clock from the 50 MHz RC oscillator clock. This 100 MHz clock is used as the base clock for the MSS and also for the fabric. The Top_M3_Master_0 includes a RAM_init_top_0 block that is used to store the eNVM data after power-up.

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![Zeroize_M2S090 Top Level Block Diagram](attachment://Zeroize_M2S090.png)

*Figure 18 • Zeroize_M2S090 Top Level Block Diagram*
Figure 19 shows the block diagram of Top_M3_Master_0. The counter block is used to show that the device is up and running. After zeroization, the LED does not blink.
**Software Implementation**

The software design example performs the following operations:

1. Initialize the System Controller Enable
2. Initialize MMUART_0
3. Move eNVM data to SRAM
4. Perform zeroize cryptography services

`MSS_SYS_zeroize_device();`

The `MSS_SYS_zeroize_device()` function initiates zeroization system service and destroys the FPGA contents.

`nvm_access();`

The `nvm_access()` function copies the data from the eNVM data client and moves it to Fabric SRAM.

**Running the Design**

The following steps describe how to run the design example on the M2GL_M2S-EVAL Kit board using the M2S090TS-1FGG484 device:

1. Connect the power supply to the M2GL_M2S-EVAL Kit board.
2. Plug the FlashPro4 ribbon cable into the JTAG Programming Header on the SmartFusion2 Security Evaluation Kit board.
3. Program the SmartFusion2 Evaluation board with the provided STAPL file. For more information about STAPL file, refer to "Appendix A: Design Files" on page 26.
4. Connect the host PC to the J18 connector using the USB mini-B cable.

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5. Invoke the SoftConsole integrated design environment (IDE), open the softconsole project, and launch the debugger.

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*Figure 20 • M2GL_M2S-EVAL Kit Board*
6. Start a HyperTerminal session with 57600 baud rate, 8 data bits, 1 stop bit, no parity, and no flow control. If the computer does not have the HyperTerminal program, any free serial terminal emulation program such as PuTTY or TeraTerm can be used. Refer to Configuring Serial Terminal Emulation Programs Tutorial for configuring HyperTerminal, TeraTerm, or PuTTY.

7. Run the debugger in the SoftConsole tool. The HyperTerminal window shows the options to run the zeroize operation. Follow the instructions as shown in Figure 21 to run the example.

The flow for zeroizing the device using tamper macro is similar to the IGLOO2 design example.

**Conclusion**

This application note describes the zeroization usage, features, and options of the SmartFusion2 and IGLOO2 devices. Zeroize_M2GL090 and Zeroize_M2S090 design examples are also provided.
Appendix A: Design Files

The design files can be downloaded from the Microsemi SoC Products Group website: http://soc.microsemi.com/download/rsc/?f=m2s_m2gl_ac433_liberov11p6_df.

The design file consists of Libero SoC Verilog project, SoftConsole software project, and programming files (*.stp) for SmartFusion2 Security Evaluation Kit board. Refer to the Readme.txt file included in the design file for the directory structure and description.
Appendix B: Running SmartDebug

The following steps describe how to read the eNVM or SRAM content.

1. Launch SmartDebug by selecting the SmartDebug Design option from the Design Flow window as shown in Figure 22. The SmartDebug window is displayed.

2. Click View Flash Memory Content to retrieve the eNVM content from the device using the SmartDebug window as shown in Figure 23. The Flash Memory window is displayed.
3. Enter the **Start Page** and **End Page** as 16, because the data storage client is stored in page 16. Page 16 is used for demonstration purposes.

4. Click **Read from Device** as shown in Figure 24. SmartDebug reads eNVM content and display it in the GUI.

5. Click **Close** to close the Flash Memory window.

6. Click **Close** to close the Debug FPGA Array window.
List of Changes

The following table shows important changes made in this document for each revision.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Revision*</th>
<th>Changes</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revision 2</td>
<td>Updated the document for Libero v11.6 software release (SAR 71463)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(October 2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revision 1</td>
<td>Initial release.</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(February 2015)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: *The revision number is located in the part number after the hyphen. The part number is displayed at the bottom of the last page of the document. The digits following the slash indicate the month and year of publication.
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